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The Due Process Need for Postponement or Use
Immunity in Probation Revocation Hearings
Based on Criminal Charges
INTRODUCTION
A probationer faced with a revocation hearing prior to a
criminal trial arising out of the same conduct is presented with
a Hobson's choice: testify at the revocation hearing and waive
the privilege against self-incrimination, allowing any self-in-
criminatory statements to be used at the subsequent trial, or
preserve the privilege against self-incrimination at the criminal
trial by waiving the right to be heard at the revocation hearing.'
Neither option is appealing to the probationer, whose "choice"
consists of the selection between three potentially damaging
courses of action: self-incrimination, perjury, or injurious
silence.
Sympathetic to this "cruel trilemma,"2 some courts have
adopted a postponement/use immunity rule. These courts re-
quire that the revocation hearing be postponed until after the
disposition of the underlying criminal charges or that the pro-
bationer be granted use immunity for testifying at the revoca-
tion hearing.3 The majority of courts, however, have declined
to afford probationers such relief.4 Most recently, the Court of
1. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized a probationer's due process
right to be heard at a revocation hearing in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(1973); see infra notes 6 and 88.
2. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 878, 533 P.2d 1024, 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384, 394 (1975); cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt").
3. See, e.g., Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam)
(parole revocation); McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 998 (Alaska 1980) (pa-
role revocation); State v. Boyd, 128 Ariz. 381, 383, 625 P.2d 970, 972 (Ct. App.
1981); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 889, 533 P.2d 1024, 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384, 402 (1975); People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 512-13, 272 N.W.2d 699, 706-07
(1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673, 679-80, 370 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1977); State v.
Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 235-36, 252 N.W.2d 664, 668-69 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 977 (1979); United States v. Brugger, 549 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 105 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1026 (1974); People v. Lee, 88 Ill. App. 3d 396, 399-400, 410 N.E.2d 646,
648-49 (1980); State v. Kartman, 192 Neb. 803, 807, 224 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1975); see
generally United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1965).
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Appeals for the Third Circuit, following the majority rule, held
that a postponement/use immunity rule is not constitutionally
required; the court also refused to adopt such a rule under its
supervisory powers.5
This Note argues that a postponement/use immunity rule
is constitutionally required to protect a probationer's due pro-
cess right to be heard at a revocation hearing. Part I considers
the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in revocation proceedings. Part II discusses the devel-
opment of the choice-of-rights test that courts have applied to
this issue. Part III examines the analyses that courts have gen-
erally employed under the choice-of-rights test in revocation
proceedings. Part IV analyzes the scope of a probationer's due
process right to be heard at the revocation hearing. Under the
due process analysis employed, this Note concludes that hold-
ing a revocation hearing prior to a related criminal trial appre-
ciably impairs the policies underlying a probationer's right to
be heard at a revocation hearing, and that a postponement/use
immunity rule is therefore constitutionally required.6
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."7 This privilege may "be asserted in any proceeding, civil
5. United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 840 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
6. Similar problems arise in other situations in which the possibility of
dual proceedings exists. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
(prison disciplinary hearings); United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (indi-
gency hearings); De Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970) (criminal prosecu-
tion concurrent with civil litigation); Hamilton v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (tax investigation), affd, 429 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1970), cert de-
nied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971). Because the precise nature of due process require-
ments varies in each of these situations, a thorough treatment of these related
situations is beyond the scope of this Note. For a survey of such cases, see
Note, Resolving Tensions Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Con-
current or Related Proceedings, 76 CoLum. L. Rav. 674, 694-707 (1976).
Probation and parole revocations differ procedurally in that probation revo-
cations generally are held before a court whereas parole revocations generally
are held before an administrative board. Both types of proceedings, however,
involve the termination of the conditional liberty of an individual previously
convicted of a crime. The Supreme Court has held that the due process re-
quirements for probation and parole revocation are identical. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). Therefore, the analysis suggested in this Note
is applicable to both types of proceedings. For consistency, all references wil
be to probation revocation.
7. U.S. CONST. amend V. The privilege against self-incrimination was
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or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudi-
catory."8 The privilege applies to any evidence that is "per-
sonal,"9 "testimonial,"' 0 and potentially incriminating." The
Supreme Court has held that the privilege entails two interre-
lated substantive guarantees: (1) the state cannot use compul-
sion to elicit any self-incriminatory statements and (2) any
such compelled testimony is inadmissible at trial.12 The prohi-
bition against compulsion includes not only physical coercion,
or the threat of imprisonment or fine, but also "any sanction
which makes assertion of the... privilege 'costly.' "13
made binding on the states by virtue of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
8. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (citing Murphy v. Wa-
terfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring)).
9. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975).
10. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
11. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). For a more exten-
sive treatment of these requirements in the context of probation revocation
proceedings, see Note, Revocation of Conditional Liberty for the Commission of
a Crime: Double Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination Limitations, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 525, 547-50 (1976).
12. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964). The Court
has also held that no adverse inferences may be drawn from the invocation of
the privilege, at least in a criminal proceeding. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
615 (1965). But see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976) (permissible to
draw adverse inferences from a prisoner's refusal to testify at a prison discipli-
nary hearing); infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
The state cannot compel an individual to waive the privilege against self-
incrimination without a grant of immunity that is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). In an early
opinion, the Supreme Court suggested that the immunity must provide abso-
lute protection from prosecution concerning the "transaction" to which the tes-
timony relates in order to supplant the privilege. See Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). In Kastigar, however, the Court rejected the trans-
actional immunity requirement and held that use immunity -sufficed to sup-
plant the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 406 U.S. at 462.
Use immunity does not prohibit the state from prosecuting the person who pro-
vided the immunized testimony; rather, it prohibits the state from using the im-
munized testimony, or any evidence derived from it, in any subsequent
criminal proceeding against the witness. In order to ensure this protection, the
state is required to prove an independent basis for all its evidence in any sub-
sequent prosecution. Id. at 460.
13. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (citing Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614 (1965)). The Supreme Court has consistently held that if the privi-
lege against self-incrimination applies, any direct sanction for the refusal to
waive the privilege creates an impermissible burden on the exercise of the
right. In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), police officers under investi-
gation for ticket-fixing were required to either waive the privilege at an investi-
gatory hearing or forfeit their jobs and pension benefits. The Supreme Court
held that the officers' subsequent testimony was compelled and therefore was
inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings against them. Id. at 500. Simi-
larly, in Spevack, a companion case to Garrity, the Court, in setting aside the
disbarment of an attorney who refused to waive the privilege, held that disbar-
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Although the Supreme Court has not defined the extent to
which the privilege against self-incrimination applies in a revo-
cation hearing, it has taken a restrictive view of the privilege in
an analogous context. In Baxter v. Palmigiano,14 the Court
held that the privilege does not apply to the same extent in a
prison disciplinary hearing as it does in a criminal trial.15 The
Court concluded that an adverse inference may be drawn from
a prisoner's refusal to testify in response to allegations of mis-
conduct because prison disciplinary hearings are not criminal
proceedings.16 Further, the Court emphasized that the trier of
fact considered the prisoner's refusal to testify only as evi-
dence, not as the equivalent of an admission of guilt.' 7 There-
fore, the Court concluded that allowing the trier of fact to draw
adverse inferences from the prisoner's refusal to testify did
not violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.18
At least one court of appeals has noted that, in light of Bax-
ter, the fifth amendment privilege might not apply in its full
rigor in probation revocation hearings. In United States v. Se-
ment constituted an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the right. 385
U.S. at 515-16.
Although the Court has reaffirmed this line of reasoning in several subse-
quent cases, see, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); Lefko-
witz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v.
Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968), it remains unclear exactly what constitutes an imper-
missible penalty, compare Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1972)
(state statute which required defendant to choose between testifying before in-
troducing any other evidence on his behalf and not testifying at all impermissi-
bly burdened defendant's fifth amendment privilege) with Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976) (allowing prison disciplinary board to draw
adverse inferences from prisoner's refusal to testify does not impermissibly
burden the prisoner's fifth amendment privilege) and McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 220 (1971) (procedure that required defendant in a capital case to
waive right to address court on issue of punishment in order to exercise privi-
lege against self-incrimination does not impermissibly burden the fifth amend-
ment privilege).
In Cunningham, the Court suggested that an impermissible burden arises
only if an individual is punished "automatically and without more" for the re-
fusal to waive the privilege. 431 U.S. at 808 n.5. This language seems to indicate
that an impermissible burden arises only when an individual is directly pun-
ished for refusing to testify. The distinction between direct and indirect penal-
ties for the refusal to waive the privilege has been criticized by courts, see, e.g.,
People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 511-12, 272 N.W.2d 699, 705-06 (1978), and
commentators, see, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 688-90.
14. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
15. Id. at 318-19.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 317-18.
18. Id. at 320.
1080 [Vol. 68:1077
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gal,19 the Ninth Circuit rejected a probationer's argument that
the standards for accepting an admission of a violation at a pro-
bation revocation hearing should be the same as the standards
for accepting a plea of guilty in a criminal trial.20 Although the
court did not decide the fifth amendment issue directly, it
stated that Baxter "at least leaves open the question of
whether the privilege should also have lesser force" in revoca-
tion hearings.2 1 The court noted that, like a prison disciplinary
hearing, a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal pro-
ceeding;22 such a hearing involves "important [state] interests
besides conviction for crime."23
Even assuming the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Segal is
correct,24 the court's analysis would not extend to a probation
revocation hearing held prior to a related criminal trial. In Bax-
ter, the Supreme Court specifically noted that "if inmates are
compelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial evidence
that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they
must be offered 'whatever immunity is required to supplant the
privilege' and may not be required to 'waive such immunity.' "125
The Court emphasized that because no criminal proceedings
were pending against the prisoner his testimony would not be
used against him in any such proceedings.2 6 A probationer's
testimony at a revocation hearing held prior to a related crimi-
nal trial, however, very likely will be used at the trial. There-
fore, although Baxter's ultimate impact on probation
revocation proceedings has yet to be determined, the Court's
reasoning suggests that the fifth amendment privilege extends
at least to revocation hearings dealing with matters that might
result in criminal proceedings.
U. THE CHOICE-OF-RIGHTS TEST
In addition to directly penalizing an individual for refusing
19. 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977).
20. Id. at 1299. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that in a criminal trial there must be an affirmative showing that a
guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent before the plea can be accepted.
21. 549 F.2d at 1299.
22. Id. at 1297.
23. Id. at 1299; see also Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 991 n.2 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979).
24. Most courts have assumed that a probationer cannot be penalized for
invoking the fifth amendment privilege. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225,
234, 252 N.W.2d 664, 668 (1977) ("it is clear a probationer cannot be penalized
for invoking his privilege against self-incrimination").
25. 425 U.S. at 316 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973)).
26. Id. at 317.
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to waive the privilege against self-incrimination,2 7 the state
may impermissibly burden the exercise of the privilege by re-
quiring an individual to waive the benefit of the privilege in or-
der to assert another constitutional right. The Supreme Court
first employed this "choice-of-rights" analysis in Simmons v.
United States,28 in which the Court held that a defendant must
be granted use immunity for testimony at a pretrial fourth
amendment suppression hearing.29 In Simmons, the defendant
moved to suppress certain evidence as the "fruits" of an unlaw-
ful search.30 To establish standing to raise the motion, the de-
fendant was required to state his connection to this highly
incriminating evidence.31 The motion to suppress was denied
and the defendant's testimony from the suppression hearing
was subsequently introduced at his trial. The Supreme Court
held that the defendant's statements at the suppression hear-
ing should not have been admitted at the subsequent trial on
the issue of guilt.32 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, fo-
cused on the tension between the defendant's fourth amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
and his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and found it "intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another."33
In language and tone, the Simmons Court appeared to cre-
ate a per se rule against forcing an individual to choose be-
tween two constitutional rights.3 4 In Melson v. Sard,35 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted
this interpretation. The court held that a parolee must be
granted use immunity for testimony at a revocation hearing
held prior to a criminal trial arising out of the same conduct 36
in order to prevent the parolee from being forced to choose be-
27. See supra note 13.
28. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
29. Id. at 394.
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id. at 389-90; see generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The pe-
titioner in Simmons was on trial for bank robbery. Police had entered the
house of the mother of one of the other defendants and seized two suitcases
which contained a number of incriminating items, including various items of
clothing. To establish standing to challenge the introduction of these items, the
petitioner was required to testify that he owned two suitcases identical to those
seized and that he was the owner of the clothing found inside the suitcases.
390 U.S. at 381.
32. 390 U.S. at 394.
33. Id.
34. See Note, supra note 6, at 678-87.
35. 402 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 655.
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tween the right to be heard at the revocation hearing37 and the
privilege against self-incrimination concerning the criminal
charges. 38 The court reasoned that without such a rule the pa-
rolee would likely be deterred from exercising the right to be
heard at the revocation hearing in order to retain the privilege
against self-incrimination for the pending criminal trial,
thereby rendering the revocation hearing "meaningless."3 9
In McGautha v. California,4° however, the Supreme Court
retreated from its broad language in Simmons. In McGautha,
the petitioner argued that Ohio's use of a unitary trial41 for cap-
ital cases created an intolerable tension prohibited by Sim-
mons because it required a defendant to choose between
remaining silent on the issue of guilt and addressing the court
on the issue of punishment. 2 Justice Harlan, again writing for
the Court, rejected this argument and significantly limited the
holding of Simmons. Harlan stated that the impermissible bur-
den in Simmons was not the burden on the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege.43 Instead, he explained, the result in
Simmons was based on the "unacceptable risk" that permitting
the use of the defendant's testimony from the suppression
hearing at the subsequent trial might deter a defendant from
"the prosecution of marginal Fourth Amendment claims, thus
weakening the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a sanction
for unlawful police behavior."4 4 Harlan rejected as "insubstan-
tial" the argument that Simmons was based solely on the bur-
den that a forced election may have placed on the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege.4 5 Harlan concluded that the result
37. Melson was decided prior to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), in
which the Supreme Court held that a parolee has a constitutional right to be
heard prior to the revocation of parole. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying
text. A District of Columbia statute, however, guaranteed a parolee the right to
a hearing and an opportunity to be heard prior to the revocation of parole. 402
F.2d at 655 n.9.
38. 402 F.2d at 655.
39. Id.
40. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
41. In a unitary trial, the issues of guilt and punishment are decided in a
single proceeding. See id. at 191-92.
42. Justice Harlan "[a]ssum[ed], without deciding, that the Constitution
does require such an opportunity" to address the court on the issue of punish-
ment. Id. at 218-19. At common law, this right was known as the right of allocu-
tion. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1967); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sen-
tencing for Felony, 81 HARv. L. REV. 821, 832-33 (1968).
43. 402 U.S. at 212.
44. Id. at 211.
45. Id. at 212.
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in Simmons was justified on fourth amendment grounds46 but
declared that the discussion in Simmons that indicated that the
result was based on a broader rationale of the tension between
rights was "open to question."47
In place of the per se rule suggested by Simmons, Harlan
proposed a new standard under which a compelled election be-
tween rights is unconstitutional only if it "impairs to an appre-
ciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."4 8
Harlan reviewed the history of, and the policies underlying, the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right of allocution 49
and determined that a unitary trial did not appreciably impair
those policies.5 0 He reasoned that a defendant in a unitary trial
faced essentially the same choice as a defendant in a bifurcated
trial: to testify and risk self-incrimination, or to remain silent
and risk waiving a valuable defense. 51 In each case, the defend-
ant's decision would depend on the force of the state's case,
and "the mere force of evidence is [not] compulsion of the type
forbidden by the privilege."52 Rather than the intolerable ten-
sion present in a case such as Simmons, a defendant in a uni-
tary trial merely faced a "difficult judgment" similar to many
others encountered throughout the trial.53 Harlan concluded
that "although the defendant may have a right, even of constitu-
tional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the
Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring
46. Id. at 211-12.
47. Id. at 212-13.
48. Id. at 213.
49. See supra note 42.
50. Concerning the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Harlan noted that the policies underlying the privilege are varied and not all of
these policies are implicated in any given application of the privilege. 402 U.S.
at 214.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court noted the
following policies underlying the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation: (1) to protect the defendant from "the cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or contempt;" (2) to maintain an accusatorial rather than
inquisatorial system of justice; (3) to prevent the elicitation of confessions by
inhumane treatment; (4) to maintain a fair state-individual balance by "requir-
ing the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individ-
ual to shoulder the entire load;" (5) respect for privacy; and (6) distrust of self-
deprecatory statements. Id. at 55.
Harlan concluded that the only policy affected by a unitary trial is that of
the "cruel trilemma," 402 U.S. at 214, and this policy is not impaired when a de-
fendant "yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk
of damaging his case on guilt." Id. at 217.
51. 402 U.S. at 213.
52. Id.
53. Id.
[Vol. 68:10771084
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him to choose." 54
III. CHOICE-OF-RIGHTS ANALYSIS IN PROBATION
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
A. RELIANCE ON McGAUTHA
Several courts have relied on McGautha to hold that a
postponement/use immunity rule is not constitutionally re-
quired for probation revocation proceedings.5 5 Most recently,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered this issue
in United States v. Bazzano.5 6 Only Chief Judge Seitz's concur-
ring opinion addressed the constitutional issue, concluding that
the case was indistinguishable from McGautha.5 7 He argued
that the forced election did not appreciably impair the policies
underlying the probationer's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.58 He reasoned that the pressure on the probationer to
waive the fifth amendment privilege was indistinguishable from
the pressure on a defendant in a unitary trial to waive the privi-
lege, which the Supreme Court found constitutionally permissi-
ble in McGautha.5 9 Accordingly, Seitz concluded that there
was no impermissible coercion on the probationer's privilege
against self-incrimination. 60
Similarly, Seitz relied on McGautha to conclude that the
forced election did not appreciably impair any of the policies
underlying the probationer's right to be heard at the revocation
hearing.6 1 Seitz reasoned that the same individual interests
that underlie the right to be heard at the revocation hearing
"also underlie [the] due process right to be heard at sentencing
... [and such interests are] not undermined by requiring [a]
defendant to risk that statements made regarding punishment
will be damaging with regard to guilt."62
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 977 (1979); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1026 (1974); People v. Lee, 88 IMI. App. 3d 396, 398, 410 N.E.2d 646, 648 (1980).
56. 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
57. Id. at 842.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. In a footnote, Chief Judge Seitz distinguished Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605 (1971), on the ground that Brooks involved a trial on the issue of
guilt rather than the revocation of conditional liberty and therefore was more
coercive. 712 F.2d at 842 n.1.
61. 712 F.2d at 843.
62. Id. at 843 (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220 (1971)). Seitz
concluded that the "individual interests protected by the due process right to
1984] 1085
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Despite the near unanimity among lower courts in inter-
preting McGautha as controlling on whether the Constitution
requires a postponement/use immunity rule for probation revo-
cation proceedings,63 reliance on McGautha is inappropiate for
several reasons. First, there is greater pressure on a proba-
tioner to testify at a revocation hearing than on a defendant to
testify at a criminal trial. Unlike a criminal trial, silence at a
revocation hearing is not a viable strategic alternative. The
state's burden of proof is lower at a revocation hearing.6 4 More-
over, many of the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial are
relaxed at a revocation hearing: illegally seized evidence may
be admitted,65 the probationer is not guaranteed the assistance
of counsel,66 and hearsay evidence may be admitted. 67 These
differences allow the state to prove its case with comparative
ease. Without a probationer's testimony to rebut or mitigate
the charges, the possibility of a judgment adverse to the proba-
tioner is substantial.68 Because the probationer is not pro-
be heard in person at a probation revocation hearing include personal partici-
pation in the revocation process, and bringing to the court's attention evidence
peculiarly within the probationer's own knowledge." Id.
63. See supra note 55.
64. Generally, the state need only prove that it is "reasonable to believe"
that a violation occurred, or some other significantly lower standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rice, 671 F.2d 455, 458 (11th Cir. 1982) ("reasonably satisf[ies]
the judge"); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 1980)
(court need only be "reasonably satisfied" that a violation has occurred);
United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1978) ("adequate proof').
But see CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(3) (1973 & Supp. 1983) (state must prove
violation beyond reasonable doubt if violation is also a criminal offense). At a
criminal trial, the state must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 830 (3d Cir. 1983) (cit-
ing cases), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984). But see United States v. Work-
man, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule
applies to probation revocation proceedings).
66. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973); cf. Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (probationer has right to counsel at deferred sen-
tencing hearing).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1980).
Indeed, with the exception of the privilege rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are inapplicable in a probation revocation proceeding. FED. R. EVID.
1101(c),(d) (3). Moreover, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
may be denied for "good cause," e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972), discovery may be denied or otherwise limited, e.g., People v. DeWitt, 78
Ill. 2d 82, 85, 397 N.E.2d 1385, 1386 (1979), and there is no right to a jury trial, e.g.,
Morgan v. State, 352 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
68. Further, if the Ninth Circuit's suggestion in United States v. Segal, 549
F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977), that it may be permissible
to draw adverse inferences from a probationer's refusal to testify prevails, see
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text, there would be an even greater pres-
sure on the probationer to testify.
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tected by the "full panoply of rights"6 9 accorded a defendant at
a criminal trial, reliance on McGautha in the context of proba-
tion revocation is inappropriate.
Second, a probationer, unlike a criminal defendant, faces
the possibility of a subsequent criminal proceeding. A defend-
ant who testifies at a criminal trial risks that the testimony may
prove harmful in that trial. In contrast, a probationer who testi-
fies at a revocation hearing prior to a related criminal trial not
only risks that such testimony may be harmful in the revoca-
tion hearing but also that it may be harmful in the subsequent
criminal trial. Therefore, a forced election is likely to have a
greater chilling effect on a probationer's right to testify at a rev-
ocation hearing than it has on a defendant's right to testify at a
criminal trial.70
Finally, reliance on McGautha is inappropriate in the pro-
bation revocation context because the unitary trial at issue in
McGautha was prescribed by statute whereas the scheduling
of a revocation hearing is generally within the discretion of the
state.71 Allowing the state to decide whether to schedule a pro-
bation revocation hearing prior to a related criminal trial may
infringe on one of the fundamental policies underlying the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination-the mainte-
nance of a fair balance between the state and those individuals
it prosecutes.7 2 Because of the lower burden of proof and re-
laxed procedural safeguards at a revocation hearing,73 the state,
when faced with a weak criminal case, may be tempted to
schedule the revocation hearing prior to the criminal trial. If
the probationer refuses to testify at the hearing, the probation
will very likely be revoked, thereby lessening the need for a
conviction.74 On the other hand, if the probationer does testify
69. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); see infra note 88.
70. A probationer is subject both to greater pressure to testify and greater
pressure not to testify than a defendant in a criminal trial, see supra notes 64-69
and accompanying text. The explanation for this apparent paradox is that the
probationer's decision is substantially different from that of a defendant in a
criminal trial because the consequences of the probationer's decision are more
severe.
71. See United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 837 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing
cases), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984); infra note 85.
72. See People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 875, 533 P.2d 1024, 1032, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 392 (1975); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 996 (Alaska
1980); People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 503, 272 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1978); see
generally Murphy v. Waterfront Comnm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
73. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
74. Although the state still has the option of prosecuting even if the de-
fendant's probation has been revoked, in many cases the state's goal is simply
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at the hearing, the state may be able to obtain incriminating ev-
idence to bolster its case at the criminal trial.7 5 Thus, the state
may be able to parlay a weak case into a "no-lose" situation in
which it relies primarily on the probationer, rather than its own
investigation, to make its case.7 6 A fair balance between state
and individual is best maintained when the state is required to
meet its high burden of proof with evidence obtained through
its own efforts before the accused must decide whether or not
to testify. Such a requirement is central to the fifth amend-
ment, and, indeed, to the whole criminal justice system.77 The
possibility that this requirement might be bypassed simply by
scheduling a revocation hearing prior to a related criminal trial
threatens the state-individual balance and distinguishes the
probation revocation situation from the situation in McGautha.
B. JuDiciAL ADOPTION OF A POSTPONEMENT/USE
IMMUNI RULE
Because the issue of whether a postponement/use immu-
nity rule is constitutionally required is close, and the Supreme
Court decisions under the choice-of-rights analysis somewhat
inconsistent,7 8 some courts have declined to address the consti-
tutional issue and have instead adopted a postponement/use
immunity rule under their supervisory powers.79 Judicial adop-
tion of a postponement/use immunity rule is consistent with
the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the purposes of
supervisory rules in federal courts: (1) to implement remedies
for violations of recognized rights; (2) to preserve judicial integ-
rity by ensuring that decisions rest on appropriate considera-
tions validly before the fact-finder; and (3) to deter illegal
incarceration and revocation serves as an effective substitute for a conviction.
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
75. See People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 877, 533 P.2d 1024, 1032-33, 120
Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 (1975).
76. See Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 105 (1st Cir.) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966)), cert. denied; 419 U.S. 1026
(1974); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 996 (Alaska 1980); People v.
Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 877, 533 P.2d 1024, 1032, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 392 (1975);
People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 513, 272 N.W.2d 699, 707 (1978).
77. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (role of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in criminal justice system).
78. See supra notes 28-60 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 998 (Alaska 1980); People v.
Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 888-89, 533 P.2d 1024, 1041-42, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 401-02
(1975); People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 512-13, 272 N.W.2d 699, 706 (1978);
State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673, 676-77, 370 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (1977); State v. Ev-
ans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 234-36, 252 N.W.2d 664, 668 (1977).
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conduct.80 All three of these purposes apply in the context of
probation revocations. A postponement/use immunity rule
would implement the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination and the right to be heard at the revocation hear-
ing.81 Such a rule would also ensure that all relevant evidence
is made available to the court at the revocation hearing, thus al-
lowing the court to base its decision on appropriate considera-
tions. 82 Moreover, a postponement/use immunity rule would
deter reliance by the state on the revocation hearing as an in-
vestigative too183 and would deny the state the opportunity to
present the probationer with the Hobson's choice referred to
above.84 Thus, adoption of a postponement/use immunity rule
under the supervisory powers of the courts constitutes an en-
tirely acceptable alternative to implementing the rule based on
the due process analysis suggested below. 85
IV. PROBATIONERS' DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO BE HEARD
Originally, courts considered probation an "act of grace"
provided by the legislature.86 Under this view, the rights of a
probationer were largely a matter of legislative discretion. Ac-
cordingly, revocation proceedings were not subject to constitu-
80. United States v. Hastings, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1978-79 (1983).
81. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 100-06.
83. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
84. See supra text accompanying note 1.
85. In United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1439 (1984), Chief Judge Seitz suggested that a postponement/use immu-
nity rule is unnecessary because, as a matter of policy, the United States Pro-
bation Office delays the initiation of revocation proceedings until after the
disposition of state criminal charges. This policy, however, is not enforceable
by the probationer and does not protect against the possibility of bad faith on
the part of the Probation Office. Therefore, the policy does not obviate the
need for a postponement/use immunity rule.
Seitz's reference to United States v. Tonnelli, 577 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1978),
does not support his position. In Tonnelli, the Third Circuit held that a super-
visory rule requiring that putative defendants be advised of their fifth and sixth
amendment rights prior to testifying in grand jury proceedings was unneces-
sary because the Justice Department had already adopted this practice. The
Justice Department's procedure, however, was to be followed in every case. As
a result, the problem of bad faith was eliminated. In contrast, the Probation Of-
fice policy referred to by Seitz is discretionary. Thus, the problem of bad faith
remains a possibility.
86. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (dictum). For a review of other
theories that courts have relied on in declining to extend the application of the
due process clause to probation revocation, see Crowe, The Exclusionary Rule
in Probation Revocation Proceedings, 13 Loy. U. Cxi L.J. 373 (1982).
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tional due process requirements. In Morrissey v. Brewer,87
however, the Supreme Court held that a parolee's conditional
liberty is a liberty interest within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment, which cannot be revoked without due pro-
cess. The process due a parolee includes the right to a
revocation hearing and the right to be heard in person at that
hearing.88
Courts that employ the choice-of-rights test in the proba-
tion revocation context have generally focused on the proba-
tioner's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and have given rather cursory treatment to the probationer's
due process right to be heard at the revocation hearing.8 9
These courts have generally presumed that the policies that
underlie a probationer's right to be heard at the revocation
hearing are the same as the policies that underlie a defendant's
right to testify at a criminal trial.90 The right to be heard at a
revocation proceeding and the right to be heard at a criminal
trial, however, are predicated on different constitutional provi-
sions 9 ' and therefore may be based on different policies. Under
the test adopted in McGautha v. California,92 compelling an in-
87. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
88. In Morrissey, the Court held that in the context of a parole revocation
hearing the due process clause requires at least a reasonably prompt, informal
inquiry by an impartial tribunal to determine if there is reasonable ground to
believe that there was a violation of the terms of parole and a subsequent hear-
ing at which the revocation decision is made. Id. at 484-89. At the second hear-
ing, the parolee is entitled to: (1) written notice of the claimed violations; (2)
disclosure of adverse evidence; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, unless denied "for good cause"; (5) a neutral and de-
tached hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder setting
forth the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole. Id. at 489; see
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (extending due process require-
ments to probation revocation).
The early 1970s witnessed a "due process explosion," which extended pro-
cedural due process requirements to several areas that previously had been
unprotected. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (public school sus-
pension); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-83 (1972) (repossession actions);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971) (driver's license suspension);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (welfare benefits termination); see
generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
89. See, e.g., Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir., 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979); United States v. Brugger, 549 F.2d 2, 4-5 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 104-05 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); State v. Boyd, 128 Ariz. 381, 383, 625 P.2d 970, 972
(Ct. App. 1981).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 843 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Seitz, CJ., concurring), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
91. See supra notes 64-69, 88, and accompanying text.
92. 402 U.S. 183 (1971); see supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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dividual to choose between the exercise of two constitutional
rights is unconstitutional if it "impairs to an appreciable extent
any of the policies behind the rights involved."93 The analysis
employed by the majority of courts is inadequate because it
fails to consider the specific policies that underlie a proba-
tioner's right to be heard at the revocation hearing. A proper
analysis of the constitutionality of holding a revocation hearing
prior to a related criminal trial must consider whether a proce-
dure that encourages a petitioner to waive the right to be heard
at the revocation hearing in order to later assert the privilege
against self-incrimination at the criminal trial appreciably im-
pairs the specific policies underlying the probationer's right to
be heard at the revocation hearing. Such an analysis necessar-
ily requires an explication of the policies underlying the proba-
tioner's right to be heard as well as a determination of the
effect that holding a revocation hearing prior to a related crimi-
nal trial has on these policies.
A. PoLIcIEs UNDERLYING A PROBATIONER'S RIGHT
TO BE HEARD
A probationer has a strong interest in being afforded an op-
portunity to be heard at the revocation hearing. The opportu-
nity to be heard may be psychologically important to the
probationer: "to have played a part in, to have made one's apt
contribution to, decisions which are about oneself may be
counted important even though the decision, as it turns out, is
the most unfavorable one imaginable and one's efforts have not
proved influential." 94 Such an opportunity is particularly sig-
nificant when the decision affects such a vital interest as one's
liberty.95
More important, the opportunity to be heard at the revoca-
tion hearing may be essential to avoid the revocation of proba-
93. 402 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).
94. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Pro-
cess, 18 Y.B. OF THE AM. SOC'Y FOR POL. & LEGAL PHi., DUE PROCESS 127-28 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
95, Revocation of probation is "the harshest action the state can take
against the individual through the administrative process." Friendly, supra
note 88, at 1296. The Supreme Court has recognized the unique severity of im-
prisonment in the context of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that "no person may be
imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial"). The Court has also noted that even conditional liberty "enables [a per-
son] to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been con-
victed of any crime." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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tion. Unlike a criminal trial, a revocation decision entails two
distinct questions: (1) whether a violation of the conditions of
probation occurred; and (2) whether this violation justifies the
revocation of probation.96 The second question provides courts
with broad discretion as to whether probationers should be
committed to prison, or whether "other steps [should] be taken
to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation."97
Thus, the ultimate decision entails both factual and subjective
judgments. The subjective nature of the decision makes the
opportunity to present mitigating evidence vital: "Even where
a violation is proven or admitted, a probationer has a due pro-
cess right to explain any mitigating circumstances and argue
that the ends of justice do not warrant revocation." 98 Often, a
probationer alone will have knowledge of such mitigating cir-
cumstances. Without the opportunity to be heard at the revo-
cation hearing, a probationer may be unable to present an
adequate defense.99
The state also has a strong interest in providing a proba-
tioner an opportunity to be heard. It has a strong interest in ac-
curate fact-finding at revocation hearings in order to ensure
informed, intelligent, and just revocation decisions. 0 0 The
state's interest in a successful probation program is dependent
on its ability to make rational revocation decisions. The "pri-
mary purpose of probation.., is to promote the rehabilitation
of the criminal by allowing him to integrate into society as a
constructive individual."101 The state needs as much informa-
tion as possible to "make certain that it is neither unnecessa-
rily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor
imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community."' 02 The
complexity and implications of this decision make it "ex-
tremely important that all reliable evidence shedding light on
the probationer's conduct be available during the probation
revocation proceedings." 03 Consequently, courts have gener-
ally declined to extend the constitutional and common law limi-
96. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
97. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
98. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 873, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr.
389, 391 (1975).
99. Moreover, the relaxed procedural safeguards at a revocation hearing,
see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text, make it more likely that a proba-
tioner without an opportunity to be heard will suffer an adverse judgment.
100. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1972).
101. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
103. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added).
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tations on the admissibility of evidence applicable in criminal
trials to revocation proceedings. 104 Instead, the due process
rights afforded a probationer are granted to ensure the full dis-
closure of evidence.105 Similarly, courts have emphasized that
revocation proceedings should be as nonadversarial as possible
in order to encourage the full disclosure of relevant evidence.106
Moreover, providing probationers with an opportunity to be
heard increases the likelihood that they will perceive that they
were treated fairly' 07 and therefore enhances the rehabilitative
prospects of probation programs. 08 Thus, the state has an in-
terest in the full disclosure of evidence, which includes testi-
mony from the probationer, in order to promote rational
revocation decisions.109
The state also has a strong, two-fold interest in law enforce-
ment. First, the state has an interest in developing law enforce-
ment procedures that are fiscally and administratively efficient.
In the context of probation, this would include the administra-
tive cost of the probation program and the revocation hearing
as well as the cost of any subsequent trial. Second, the state
has an interest in effective law enforcement. Primary to this
concern is the state's interest in promoting public safety by re-
moving from society those persons whose behavior does not
conform to society's laws. Somewhat related is the more ab-
stract concept of promoting respect for the law in general by
publicly punishing those who break the law. In the context of
probation revocation, both of these interests are magnified be-
104. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 88.
106. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973); see also Note, supra
note 11, at 528.
107. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Revoking a proba-
tioner's liberty without providing an opportunity to be heard prior to the deci-
sion may leave the probationer bitter and "generate negative reactions and
attitudes at odds with the rehabilitative goals of the penal system." People v.
Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 874, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 391 (1975).
108. See People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 874, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 391 (1975) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972)); see
also Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 34 n.16 (1979) (Marshall,
J., dissenting in part) (emphasizing the importance, for purposes of rehabilita-
tion, of fair treatment in parole release procedures); cf. Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Higher Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.) (failure of school to exercise
"fundamental principles of fairness" in school disciplinary hearings may set an
example "if not corrected by the courts, ... [that] can well break the spirits of
the expelled students and of others familiar with the injustice, and do inestima-
ble harm to their education"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
109. Moreover, the state has a practical incentive to avoid unnecessary revo-
cations: prison is substantially more expensive than probation. Cf. Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
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cause the probationer has already been convicted of a crime. 110
B. THE EFFECT OF HOLDING A REVOCATION HEARING PRIOR TO
A RELATED CRIMINAL TRIAL ON THE POUCIES
UNDERLYING THE PROBATIONER'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Both the probationer and the state have strong interests in
the full disclosure of all relevant evidence at the revocation
hearing."' Although mitigating evidence possesses special sig-
nificance in revocation proceedings," 2 it often consists of dam-
aging factual admissions coupled with more or less compelling
moral excuses. It is exactly this type of evidence that is most
likely to be withheld because of the fear of self-incrimination
concerning the pending criminal trial. I13 Therefore, holding a
revocation hearing prior to a related criminal trial is contrary to
both the probationer's and the state's interests in the full dis-
closure of all the relevant evidence at the revocation hearing.
Holding a revocation hearing prior to a related criminal
trial may be essential to efficient and effective law enforcement.
In his concurring opinion in United States v. Bazzano, 114 Chief
Judge Seitz argued that a postponement/use immunity rule
was not constitutionally required because the burdens imposed
on the state by such a rule outweighed the benefits." 5 Seitz
concluded that because the burdens would vary from case to
case, the issue was best left to the discretion of the trial
judge,116 but noted that "inconvenience... may result from an
untimely motion for postponement."" 7 For example, in Baz-
zano, the probationer did not raise his request for postpone-
ment until after the revocation hearing had begun. At that
point, postponement would have caused serious hardship to
110. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
111. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
113. The ultimate issue at a criminal trial is simply whether or not a viola-
tion of the law occurred. Consequently, moral excuses offered as mitigating ev-
idence at a revocation hearing may prove very damaging at a criminal trial.
Further, because probationers are by definition law-breakers, their credibility
is likely to be low, especially if the state's charges are denied. A probationer's
testimony is more likely to be accepted, and hence more valuable to the court,
if it adds to rather than detracts from the state's version of the facts. See Peo-
ple v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 874, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 391
(1975).
114. 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
115. Id. at 842-43.
116. Id. at 843.
117. Id. at 844.
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the probation officials because several of their witnesses were
from out-of-town."i8 In addition, Seitz argued that postpone-
ment would not be a viable alternative when no criminal
charges are pending, "the disposition of which could mark the
time at which the probation revocation hearing would be
recommenced."119 Finally, Seitz was concerned that a delay
might "result in the loss of evidence, the disappearance or
death of witnesses, or other forms of prejudice to the govern-
ment."'120 Turning to the question of use immunity, Seitz ar-
gued that such a requirement would "impose on the
government the substantial burden in a subsequent criminal
prosecution of proving that its evidence was derived from a
source wholly independent of the probationer's previously im-
munized testimony."121
Chief Judge Seitz treats postponement and use immunity
as separate, rigid rules that are to be mechanically applied. As
a result, he greatly exaggerates the potential burdens that
these rules would impose on the state. Postponement and use
immunity are more properly characterized as alternative reme-
dies. If the circumstances are such that either postponement
or use immunity would greatly inconvenience the state, the
other remedy should be employed.122 When the two remedies
are considered as alternatives, the practical reasons against
adopting a postponement/use immunity rule are considerably
less persuasive. The inconvenience caused by an untimely mo-
tion will not result because the rule involves alternative proce-
dures, both of which will protect a probationer's right to be
heard. The state can choose whichever procedure is more ap-
propriate for the specific case and each side can plan accord-
ingly. The problem of losing evidence and witnesses, of course,
affects both sides; 23 if the state has a special reason to avoid
postponement, it can grant the probationer use immunity and
hold the hearing quickly. Finally, if no criminal charges are
pending against the probationer the need for a postpone-
ment/use immunity rule is even greater because, in such a sit-
uation, the state would be more tempted to use the revocation
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 843.
122. But see infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (suggesting that post-
ponement is the preferable procedure).
123. Because silence is not a viable alternative at a revocation hearing, see
supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text, loss of evidence is likely to be more
harmful to a probationer than to a defendant in a criminal trial.
1984] 1095
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
hearing as a means to bolster a weak case.124
Postponement would not impair the state's interest in pub-
lic safety; if necessary and appropriate, a probationer accused
of violating the criminal law could be taken into custody pend-
ing the outcome of the criminal trial.125 Moreover, postpone-
ment might encourage more thorough police work and thus
promote public safety by reducing the state's incentive to use
the revocation hearing as an investigative tool.126
If the state's goal is merely incarceration of a probationer,
revocation is often preferred to a criminal conviction because
revocation hearings are generally less expensive than criminal
trials.127 If the state does not intend to prosecute a probationer,
it is in no way burdened by a grant of use immunity. On the
other hand, if the state intends to prosecute, postponement of
the revocation hearing would not increase the cost of either
proceeding and, indeed, might even save money. By relieving a
probationer of the difficult decision between remaining silent
and testifying, and by encouraging the full disclosure of evi-
dence, the revocation hearing will be less adversarial and, pre-
sumably, less expensive. 2 8 In any event, the fiscal burden
imposed on the state by postponement would seem to be bear-
able; it is even standard policy in some jurisdictions to delay
the initiation of revocation proceedings until after the disposi-
tion of the underlying criminal charges.129
Similarly, a grant of use immunity to a probationer when
the revocation hearing is held prior to a related criminal trial
would not impose substantial burdens on the state. Use immu-
nity is employed in several other contexts without significant
124. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
125. In Bazzano, the petitioner argued that, "if necessary and appropriate, a
probationer who is accused of violating the terms of his probation can be taken
into custody pending the outcome of the revocation hearing." 712 F.2d at 836.
Because the majority declined to adopt a postponement/use immunity rule,
this issue was expressly left open. Id. The ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRO-
BATION § 5.3 (Approved Draft 1970) provide that "upon a showing of probable
cause that another crime has been committed by the probationer, the probation
court should have discretionary authority to detain the probationer without
bail pending a determination of the new criminal charges." (Emphasis added).
126. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
127. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
128. For example, counsel is appointed in probation revocation proceedings
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the probationer's need. See Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973). A probationer who does not have to make the
difficult choice between testifying and remaining silent will have less need for
counsel.
129. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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impairment of law enforcement functions. 13 0 Indeed, a grant of
use immunity does not penalize the state. Rather, use immu-
nity merely prevents the state from gaining a windfall by put-
ting it in the same position it would have been in had the
probationer not testified.131 Although requiring the state to
prove an independent basis for its evidence at a subsequent
trial might involve some administrative burdens, 3 2 such a re-
quirement would not adversely affect the state's ability to ob-
tain evidence. In the event of an ongoing investigation, the
state can limit the possibility that it will be unable to establish
an independent basis by carefully recording the evidence ob-
tained prior to immunization and by limiting the number of
people who have access to the immunized testimony.133
The state also has an interest in preventing perjury,3 4 and,
under due process analysis, both the the state and the proba-
tioner have an interest in presenting all the relevant evidence
in order to allow the trier of fact to make a rational decision.135
Because only truthful evidence is relevent, an exception to the
use immunity rule should be made in situations where the pro-
bationer's revocation hearing testimony is materially inconsis-
tent with the probationer's testimony at the subsequent
criminal trial. In such cases, the revocation hearing testimony
should be admitted for purposes of impeachment. 3 6 An im-
peachment exception is a rational accomodation of the individ-
130. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (grand jury testi-
mony); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (pretrial fourth amend-
ment suppression hearing); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980)
(defense witness immunity).
131. Indeed, the state may even be in a better position. See infra note 142.
132. See United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 845 (3d Cir. 1983) (Seitz,
C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
133. In ongoing investigations, the need for a grant of use immunity is even
greater because there is a greater incentive for the state to use the revocation
hearing as an investigative tool. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
134. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), Justice Black ex-
pressed concern that a grant of use immunity for a defendant's testimony at a
pretrial suppression hearing would bar the state "from offering a truthful state-
ment made by a defendant ... in order to prevent the defendant from winning
an acquittal on the false premise that" what was sworn to in the earlier pro-
ceeding is not true. Id. at 396 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
135. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
136. Many courts that have adopted a postponement/use immunity rule
under their supervisory powers, see supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text,
have allowed an impeachment exception. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 128 Ariz. 381,
383, 625 P.2d 970, 972 (Ct. App. 1981) (postponement/use immunity rule re-
quired by state rules of criminal procedure); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867,
892-93, 533 P.2d 1024, 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 404 (1975); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.
2d 225, 235-36, 252 N.W.2d 664, 668-69 (1977).
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ual's interest in testifying and the state's interests in promoting
full disclosure of evidence and preventing peijury. 3 7
C. RESULTS OF THE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Holding a revocation hearing prior to a related criminal
trial without a grant of use immunity appreciably impairs the
specific policies underlying a probationer's right to be heard at
the revocation hearing. In such a situation, there is a signifi-
cant risk that the probationer will be deterred from testifying.
As a result, potentially relevant evidence is suppressed.138
Moreover, holding a revocation hearing prior to the disposition
of the underlying criminal charges may be contrary to the
state's interest in efficiency if it makes the revocation hearing
more adversarial.139
The adoption of a postponement/use immunity rule would
protect the state's interest in the full disclosure of evidence
without impairing the state's law enforcement interests. If rev-
ocation hearings were postponed until after the disposition of
related criminal charges, the fear of self-incrimination would no
longer exist.140 On the other hand, if revocation hearings held
137. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly upheld the use of im-
munized testimony for impeachment purposes, it has implied that such use
would be permissible. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), the Court
overruled the "automatic standing" rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960), which allowed a criminal defendant charged with a crime of possession
to challenge the legality of a search without regard to whether the defendant
had an expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, reasoned that the Simmons use immunity rule obvi-
ated the need for the automatic standing doctrine. 448 U.S. at 88-90. Rehnquist
noted that the "Court has not decided whether Simmons precludes the use of a
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at
trial." Id. at 93-94. He noted further that "the protective shield of Simmons is
not to be converted into a license for false representations." Id. at 94 n.9 (quot-
ing United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974)). Thus, Simmons does not
preclude the use of the petitioner's testimony for impeachment. Cf. United
States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974) (allowing the admission of a defend-
ant's prior inconsistent statements made at an indigency hearing); Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1971) (holding that Simmons prohibits only di-
rect admission of testimony from a suppression hearing); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (statements obtained by police in violation of Mi-
randa may be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who takes the
stand to testify in his or her own defense). But cf. New Jersey v. Portash, 440
U.S. 450 (1979) (immunized testimony made before grand jury is inadmissible
in a subsequent criminal trial for impeachment purposes). Portash, however,
involved directly compelled testimony. In contrast, use immunity in the proba-
tion context would be granted to allow the probationer to testify.
138. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 128.
140. Because the state's burden of proof is higher at a criminal trial, there
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prior to the criminal trials were accompanied by a grant of use
immunity, most, if not all,141 of the probationer's concern about
self-incrimination would be removed.142 In either case, a proba-
tioner's decision would no longer be controlled by the fear of
self-incrimination. Further, if a postponement/use immunity
rule were adopted, the state's interest in effective and efficient
law enforcement would not be impaired.143
Judge Garth's opinion in United States v. Bazzano'44 sug-
gests that postponement should be the preferred procedure
and use immunity should be the exception.145 Although he did
not explain this preference, 146 his suggestion is sound for a
number of reasons. First, postponement will usually cause the
state less inconvenience. 4 7 Second, probationers are protected
from the possibility that the state may work backwards from
the immunized testimony, either in bad faith or unintention-
ally, to establish an independent basis. Third, probationers will
not have to disclose their defense strategy prior to the criminal
trial.148 Fourth, if the immunized testimony is admissible for
impeachment, 49 defendants in subsequent criminal trials
will be no "chilling" of the defendant's right to be heard if the criminal trial
precedes the revocation hearing.
141. Some courts and commentators have argued that use immunity may
provide inadequate protection because it requires the probationer to disclose
his or her defense strategy prior to the criminal trial. See, e.g., McCracken v.
Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997 (Alaska 1980); Note, "Catch-22'" A Probationer's and
Parolee's Choice Between the Right to be Heard and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 9 PAc. L.J. 949 (1978). Such protestations, however, are incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's determination that use immunity supplants
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Similarly, the Court has upheld certain pretrial dis-
covery procedures in criminal cases that require a defendant to disclose his or
her defense strategy. See Williams v. Flordia, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); see also De
Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970) (rejecting the claim that a judge facing
a disbarment hearing prior to a related criminal trial is entitled to postpone-
ment rather than use immunity because use immunity would require him to
disclose his defense strategy prior to trial). Thus, although postponement may
be advantageous in most situations, see infra text accompanying notes 144-53, it
is clear that use immunity is constitutionally adequate to prevent the chilling
of a probationer's right to be heard.
142. Even courts that have refused to adopt a postponement/use immunity
rule have recognized the desirability of such a procedure. See, e.g., Ryan v.
Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979); Flint
v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 104-05 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
143. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
144. 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
145. Id. at 838.
146. Id. at 850-51 (Adams, J., dissenting).
147. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 132-33 (possible problems in grant-
ing use immunity).
148. See supra note 141.
149. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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might be required to remain silent in order to prevent the intro-
duction of the previous testimony. 5 0 This may deter defend-
ants from presenting at trial relevant, nonincriminating
evidence that is arguably inconsistent with prior statements.
Some courts that have adopted a postponement/use immunity
rule have also recommended postponement as the preferable
procedure,151 and this view is adopted in both the ABA Stan-
dards Relating to Probation52 and the Model Penal Code.153
CONCLUSION
The dilemma of a probationer faced with a revocation hear-
ing prior to a criminal trial arising out of the same conduct can
be effectively solved by the adoption of a postponement/use
immunity rule. Under the analysis suggested in this Note, a
postponement/use immunity rule is constitutionally required
in order to protect a probationer's due process right to be heard
at a revocation hearing. Without a postponement/use immu-
nity rule, a probationer must waive the right to be heard at the
revocation hearing in order to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination at a subsequent criminal trial. Requiring a pro-
bationer to choose between the exercise of these rights appre-
ciably impairs the policies underlying the right to be heard.
Specifically, it impairs the interest of both the probationer and
the state in the full disclosure of evidence. The adoption of a
postponement/use immunity rule would adequately protect a
probationer's due process right to be heard without imposing
any significant burdens on the state. Accordingly, such a rule
is required under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Joseph Doyle
150. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 894, 533 P.2d 1024, 1045, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384, 405 (1975).
151. McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997 (Alaska 1980); People v. Cole-
man, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 896, 533 P.2d 1024, 1046-47, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 406-07 (1975);
State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 240-41, 252 N.W.2d 664, 671 (1977) (Abrahamson,
J., concurring).
152. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 5.3 (Approved Draft 1970); see
supra note 125.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model
Penal Code requires the disposition of the related criminal charges prior to the
initiation of revocation proceedings.
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